This article analyzes the organization and functioning of the Byzantine salt monopoly. Saltworks were owned by the state, but some were also owned by monasteries and laymen. State-owned saltworks were not run as state enterprises; rather, their operations were auctioned to private individuals by competitive bidding conducted by provincial governors. Auctions of saltworks could be combined with concessions of the salt sales tax or other rights to sources of local revenue (e. g. fisheries, wharfage). Concessionaires of saltworks often were obligated (...) to deliver salt free of charge and tax in perpetuity to influential monasteries because of long-standing local customs. The state had a fiscal, not a market monopoly on salt as the price of salt was determined by market forces. Still, topography and seasonality of production and trade could provide opportunities for exploitation of inter-spatial and intertemporal price differentials. Disaggregation of the salt market into definable producer–wholesaler, wholesaler–retailer, and retailer–consumer submarkets evinces the varying impact that market structure can have on the degree of competition and on the firms' pricing strategies. (shrink)

This article provides an in depth analysis of the organization, technology employed and functioning of the guild-organized leather manufacturing industry in the capital during the tenth century. Emphasis is placed on the internai organization and operations of the establishments; the technical processes employed; their business organization form and governing rules; the implications of the guild's occupational exclusivity; the likely market structure, degree of exercisable market power, and their impact on price competition. The scale of operations and growth of firms was (...) determined by entrepreneurial decisions based on market signais. Prices and wages were set by market forces – not by the guild. Pro-competitive regulations and unimpeded new entry fostered correct business conduct and maintained a level playing field. Occupational exclusivity did flot ensure market monopoly, as the guiid system did not aim to promote the members' economic interests, thwart intra-guild and extemal competition, or achieve equality of economic resuits. (shrink)

This article examines the organization, location, technology employed, and the price-setting strategies entertained by the olive oil mill industry in Byzantium. The methods and mechanical devices employed in the process of decorticating the olives, extraction of the oil from the pulp, and its refinement are analyzed in depth. Particular emphasis is placed on the challenges and the attendant price-setting calculus the oil press industry faced as a capital-intensive, seasonal, and topography bound activity. In monopolistic situations, the oil millers’ situational monopoly (...) was nominal compelling them to seek satisfactory rather than maximum profits, albeit likely above normal levels. In oligopolistic situations, the limited number of suppliers of the service, mutually recognized interdependence, the unpredictable outcome of confrontational pricing tactics and the ensuing costly cutthroat competition, and the fragility and illegality of collusive arrangements would tend to produce uniform and rather stable fees, albeit at levels possibly allowing for some excess profits. The state did not interfere with the oil miller’s pricing policies, appreciating the impracticality of such interventions and preferring to relegate the task to the operative market forces and the price mechanism. (shrink)

This article investigates particular issues that remain unexplored or unsettled in the state-controlled banking services sector in Byzantium , comprising the guilds of dealers in bullion and the bankers . It establishes that money-changing remained the exclusive prerogative of the trapezitai and was safeguarded by guild regulations aiming to secure the soundness of the monetary system, while money-lending was governed by statute law and was carried on by trapezitai in competition with other guild members making loans as a sideline activity (...) and private money-lenders operating outside the guild system. The argyropratai dealt in precious metals and stones, undertook appraisals of valuables for a fee, and made, sold or repaired jewelry. The guilds' occupational exclusivity in money-changing and trading and precious metals did not establish a market monopoly, as the guild system did not aim to advance the members' economic interests, thwart intra-guild competition, or achieve equality of financial results for the membership. Neither the state nor the guilds set commissions on currency transactions, prices of precious metals, or fees for services, such determination being left to market forces. (shrink)

This article probes key issues that remain unexplored, misconstrued, or unsettled in the guild-organized soapmaking industry in Constantinople, as they relate to its organization, modus operandi, and the degree of state intervention. Neither the state nor the guild attempted to micromanage the firms' activities, as the number and size of workshops, the number of hired workers, production methods, quantity and quality of output were outside their purview. Prices and wages were determined by market forces. Training of apprentices was streamlined to (...) match the industry's capacity. Proliferation of small scale workshops was due primarily to managerial constraints and limited borrowing capacity — not to deliberate state policy to check enterprise growth. Regulations of agoranomic nature aimed to ensure the orderly function of the marketplace, correct business conduct, and consumer protection. Equality of opportunity rather than equality of economic results was the foundation of the state's industrial policy. (shrink)